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Abstract 
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1 Introduction
In the years following the global financial crisis, many European governments implemented
sizeable austerity measures. These included spending cuts and tax increases and were
meant to confront concerns about rising levels of public debt or outright solvency issues.
In fact, yields on debt issued by several European sovereigns started to take off by 2010,
reflecting sizeable default premiums (Krishnamurthy et al., 2014). Still, as austerity
measures were implemented, default premiums kept rising. Moreover, as Figure 1 illus-
trates, large spending cuts were associated with strong increases of the default premium.
Against this background, we ask whether austerity actually pays off. Specifically, we ask
whether austerity causes the default premium to decline and, if so, when and under which
circumstances.
We focus on how financial markets respond to austerity measures and sidestep the issue
of how such measures impact the actual health of government finances. While austerity
impacts fiscal fundamentals such as the level of sovereign debt, these fundamentals typically
fail to provide a sufficient statistic for assessing the sustainability of debt. For the ability
and willingness of governments to service its debt obligations and to roll over liabilities
also depends on market conditions (Calvo, 1988; Cole and Kehoe, 2000; Roch and Uhlig,
2015) and a number of country-specific, partly unobserved factors such as the ability to
raise tax revenues (Bi, 2012; Lorenzoni and Werning, 2014; Trabandt and Uhlig, 2011).
The same level of debt may thus have very different implications for debt sustainability at
different times and in different countries. The default premium demanded by financial
markets, instead, is based on a broader assessment and provides a more comprehensive
picture.
To take up the issue, we assemble a new data set for the sovereign default premium
in a large number of countries, including countries outside of the euro area. Specifically,
we construct time series for the sovereign default premium in 38 developed and emerging
economies, covering the period since the early 1990s. We compute the default premium
as the difference in sovereign yields vis-à-vis a riskless reference country where sovereign
default can be ruled out for practical purposes. Importantly, we only consider yields on
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Figure 1: Sovereign default premium and austerity in selected euro area economies:
2010Q1–2012Q2. Notes: vertical axis measures change of default premium in
basis points, horizontal axis measures reduction of real government consump-
tion in percent, see Section 2 for detailed description of the data.
government securities issued in a common currency in order to eliminate confounding
factors due to expectations of inflation and currency depreciation. For more recent
observations, we also rely on data for credit default swap (CDS) spreads. We analyze the
variation of the default premium in some detail, both across countries and over time, and
summarize it by the cumulative distribution function.
Our interest is on how the sovereign default premium responds to austerity measures.
Because we lack high quality data on taxes and transfers, we investigate how changes of
government consumption impact the default premium.1 In doing so, we focus on three
dimensions. First, we distinguish between the response of the default premium in the short
run and in the long run. In this regard, we obtain an important result: austerity pays off,
but only in the long run. Specifically, we find that a cut of government consumption by
one percent reduces the default premium by about 17 basis points in the long run. In
contrast, during the first two years after the cut, the premium increases sharply. At the
same time, we find a significant decline of output.
Second, we use the cumulative distribution function of the sovereign default premium
to classify initial conditions in terms of “fiscal stress”: the premium rises in the short run
only if the premium is high to begin with. This condition is often met when austerity
1Some authors find that whether austerity is tax based or spending based is crucial for how it impacts
the economy (see, for recent contributions, Alesina and Ardagna, 2013; Alesina et al., 2015a,b).
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measures are implemented, as we document in ongoing work (Born et al., 2016). Third,
we vary the size of the shock. While cutting government consumption pushes up the
premium, the converse does not apply: an increase of government consumption in times of
fiscal stress leaves the default premium basically unchanged. More generally, we document
that size matters: large cuts of government consumption have a disproportionate effect on
the premium in the short run—provided fiscal stress is high. The differences along these
dimensions turn out to be statistically significant. They also matter economically, as they
easily amount to some 50 basis points, given a change of government consumption by one
percent.
We use a number of alternative time-series models to establish these results.2 In terms
of identification we draw on earlier work by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Ramey
(2011b). Importantly, we assume that government consumption is predetermined relative
to output and the sovereign default premium: we interpret any variation of government
consumption which is unaccounted for by past observations as a structural innovation.
We dispel two major concerns which may arise in this context. First, policy makers may
respond swiftly and systematically to increases of the default premium, notably in times
of fiscal stress. We show that this is not the case by identifying a common factor of the
sovereign default premium in the cross-section of our panel data set. While government
consumption is indeed reduced in response to a higher (common) default premium, it
takes time for this effect to materialize. Second, market participants may anticipate fiscal
measures. To address this concern, we purge our measure of fiscal shocks by the forecast
of government consumption, which is available for a subset of our sample.
Our findings for the short run seemingly support the notion that financial markets are
“schizophrenic” about austerity in that they demand austerity measures as public debt
builds up, but fail to reward them as austerity slows down output growth (Blanchard, 2011;
Cotarelli and Jaramillo, 2013). To investigate this issue, we rely on a structural model
of optimal sovereign default. Specifically, we modify the model of Arellano (2008) by
2We build on the classic studies of the fiscal transmission mechanism within vector autoregressive
models (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Mountford and Uhlig, 2009; Ramey, 2011b), but also on local
projections (Jordá, 2005). Throughout, we allow the effects of austerity measures to be non-linear.
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allowing for exogenous variation in government consumption and a multiplier effect of such
variation on output. The model predicts, in line with the evidence, that cutting government
consumption temporarily raises the default premium if fiscal stress is high. This, however,
is not because financial market participants are schizophrenic about austerity. Rather, this
is because, as long as output is temporarily reduced due to austerity, investors understand
that a government is tempted to default on its debt obligations in order to free scarce
resources from debt service for other expenditures.
Our paper relates to a number of empirical studies which explore the state-dependence
of the effects of fiscal policy (e.g., Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012; Ramey and
Zubairy, 2014). While the issue remains controversial to date, earlier work by Perotti
(1999) established that fiscal policy affects the economy differently in “good times” and
“bad”. More recently, Corsetti et al. (2012a), Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013), and
Ilzetzki et al. (2013) find that the fiscal multiplier depends on the level of public debt.
Bertola and Drazen (1993) and Corsetti et al. (2013) provide model-based analyses.
Giavazzi et al. (2000) suggest that the size and persistence of fiscal measures also matters
for their effects. Earlier studies have also focused on how financial markets respond to
fiscal policy measures. Ardagna (2009), for instance, reports that interest rates tend to
decline in response to large fiscal consolidations. Laubach (2009) finds that future debt
and deficits tend to raise U.S. interest rates. Akitoby and Stratmann (2008) focus on how
sovereign yield spreads in emerging markets react to changes of fiscal indicators.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the construction
of our data set. In this section, we also establish a number of basic facts regarding the
time-series properties of the sovereign default premium and its relationship to government
consumption and output growth. We discuss our econometric approach and our results
in Sections 3 and 4. Section 5 provides a structural interpretation through the lens of a
model of optimal sovereign default. Section 6 offers some conclusions.
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2 Data
Our analysis is based on a new data set. It contains quarterly observations for government
consumption, output, and the sovereign default premium in 38 emerging and advanced
economies. While data on default premiums are available at higher frequency, data on
macroeconomic aggregates are not. For a long time, time-series studies of the fiscal
transmission mechanism have been limited to a small set of countries because high-quality
quarterly data for government consumption was not available.3 Rather, quarterly data
was often derived from indirect sources using time disaggregation/interpolation. In a
recent contribution, Ilzetzki et al. (2013) have collected quarterly data based on direct
sources for government consumption for 44 countries. Quarterly data of a comparable
coverage for other fiscal variables such as taxes, transfers, or deficits are not available;
hence our focus on government consumption.
We collect quarterly data for government consumption expenditure based on national
accounts/non-financial accounts of the government along the lines of Ilzetzki et al. (2013).
On the one hand, we limit our focus to those countries for which we are also able to
compute a sovereign default premium. On the other hand, we extend their sample to
include more recent observations and additional countries for which we were able to
confirm with statistical agencies the availability of government consumption data based
on direct sources.4 The full sample coverage is shown in Table 1. Our earliest observation
for which we obtain data on the default premium and on government consumption is
1991Q1, namely for Denmark and Italy. Our sample runs up to 2014.
Table 1 also provides summary statistics for the government consumption-to-GDP
ratio for our sample where both government consumption data and default premiums are
available. Government consumption from national accounts/non-financial accounts of the
3Some studies have resorted to annual data (e.g., Beetsma et al., 2006, 2008; Bénétrix and Lane, 2013).
In this case identification assumptions tend to be more restrictive. However, Born and Müller (2012)
consider both quarterly and annual data for four OECD countries. They find that the estimated effects
of government spending shocks do hardly differ.
4For several European countries, we also include earlier observations for the 1990s whenever we are
able to compute a default premium. In this case, government consumption data is available through
Eurostat. However, it is not entirely based on direct sources, implying that the data falls short of the
more recent Eurostat standards, firmly established for data since the mid-2000s only. We therefore verify
below that our results are robust with respect to employing a more conservative sample.
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Table 1: Basic properties of government consumption-to-GDP ratio
Country first obs last obs min max mean std
Argentina 1994Q1 2013Q3 11.8 18.3 13.9 1.6
Australia 2003Q2 2010Q3 17.0 18.1 17.5 0.3
Austria 1994Q1 2014Q1 17.8 20.5 19.1 0.7
Belgium 1995Q1 2014Q1 21.1 25.3 22.8 1.4
Brazil 1995Q1 2014Q1 18.8 22.6 20.4 0.8
Bulgaria 1999Q1 2014Q1 14.1 20.5 17.6 1.5
Chile 1999Q3 2014Q2 4.5 6.5 5.6 0.5
Colombia 2000Q1 2014Q1 15.1 17.3 16.3 0.5
Croatia 2004Q2 2014Q1 18.2 20.6 19.5 0.6
Czech Republic 2004Q2 2014Q1 19.3 22.0 20.8 0.7
Denmark 1991Q1 2014Q1 24.7 30.1 26.4 1.5
Ecuador 1995Q2 2014Q1 8.9 14.2 11.6 1.5
El Salvador 2002Q3 2014Q1 6.4 8.8 7.3 0.6
Finland 1992Q3 2014Q1 19.6 25.0 22.1 1.6
France 1999Q2 2014Q1 22.7 25.1 23.8 0.7
Germany 2004Q2 2014Q1 17.7 20.1 19.0 0.6
Greece 2000Q1 2011Q1 16.9 22.3 18.0 1.1
Hungary 1999Q2 2014Q1 20.2 24.7 21.8 1.1
Ireland 1997Q1 2014Q1 13.9 20.8 16.7 1.7
Italy 1991Q1 2014Q1 17.5 21.6 19.4 1.0
Latvia 2006Q2 2014Q1 15.5 21.8 18.0 1.6
Lithuania 2005Q3 2014Q1 16.6 22.1 18.8 1.6
Malaysia 2000Q1 2014Q1 6.6 12.1 9.8 1.2
Mexico 1994Q1 2014Q2 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.1
Netherlands 1999Q2 2014Q2 20.2 26.8 23.8 2.2
Peru 1997Q2 2014Q2 6.9 9.4 8.0 0.5
Poland 1995Q1 2014Q1 16.8 19.9 18.1 0.6
Portugal 1995Q1 2014Q1 17.2 22.3 19.5 1.4
Slovakia 2004Q2 2014Q1 16.8 20.1 18.3 0.9
Slovenia 2003Q2 2014Q1 17.1 21.0 19.5 1.2
South Africa 1995Q1 2014Q1 17.9 22.8 19.6 1.4
Spain 1995Q1 2014Q1 16.9 21.8 18.6 1.6
Sweden 1993Q2 2014Q2 6.7 9.8 7.8 0.8
Thailand 1997Q3 2014Q2 9.8 14.4 12.1 1.2
Turkey 1998Q1 2014Q1 9.7 15.7 12.8 1.4
United Kingdom 1993Q1 2013Q4 17.5 23.4 20.2 1.6
United States 2008Q1 2014Q1 14.7 17.1 16.1 0.7
Uruguay 2001Q3 2014Q1 10.0 14.2 11.1 1.2
Notes: Government consumption is consumption of the general government except for Chile, El Salvador,
Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, and Sweden, where it refers to central government consumption. The government
consumption-to-GDP ratio is computed as the ratio of nominal variables, except for Uruguay, where we
compute it as the ratio of real variables. The ratio is measured in percentage points. For Mexico, the
share of central government wages and goods and services purchases is only a very small share of GDP.
government is exhaustive government final consumption. It is accrual based and does
not include transfer payments or government investment (see Lequiller and Blades, 2006,
Chapter 9). Depending on the availability of quarterly time series, it pertains to either the
6
general or the central government. The ratio of government consumption-to-GDP varies
both across time and across countries. In case of general government data, government
consumption fluctuates around 18 percent of GDP.
As a distinct contribution, we also construct a panel data set for the sovereign
default premium in order to measure the assessment of financial markets regarding the
sustainability of public finances. Given observations on quarterly government consumption,
we aim to construct measures of default risk for as many countries as possible. As stressed
in the introduction, we construct a mostly spread-based measure using yields for securities
issued in common currency. To the extent that goods and financial markets are sufficiently
integrated, we thus eliminate fluctuations in yields due to changes in real interest rates,
inflation expectations, and the risk premiums associated with them. In addition to a
default risk premium, if duration differs or drifts, yield spreads may still reflect a term
premium (see Broner et al., 2013). We try to minimize the term premium by constructing
the yield spread on the basis of yields for bonds with a comparable maturity and coupon.5
As a result, yield spreads should primarily reflect financial markets’ assessment of the
probability and extent of debt repudiation by a sovereign.6
We obtain our default-risk measure based on four distinct sources/strategies. First,
for a subset of (formerly) emerging markets we directly rely on J.P. Morgan’s Emerging
Markets Bond Index (EMBI) spreads, which measure the difference in yields between
dollar-denominated government or government-guaranteed bonds of a country and U.S.
government bonds.7
Second, we add to those observations data for euro area countries based on the “long-
term interest rate for convergence purposes”. Those are computed as yields to maturity
from “long-term government bonds or comparable securities” with a residual maturity
of close to 10 years with sufficient liquidity (for details, see European Central Bank,
5We focus on long-term rates whenever possible. As they are closely linked to the average of expected
future short-term rates, they are a more appropriate measure of governments’ refinancing costs than
short-term rates. Assessing the effects of austerity on the term structure is beyond the scope of the
present study.
6In principle, spreads may also reflect a liquidity premium—an issue we ignore in what follows because
we consider government debt traded in mature markets. See Appendix A.1.3 for a more detailed discussion.
7See Appendix A.1.1 for details on the EMBI.
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2004). For this country group, we use the German government bond yield as the risk-free
benchmark rate and compute spreads relative to the German rate.8
Third, we make use of the issuance of foreign-currency government bonds in many
advanced economies during the 1990s and 2000s to extend our sample to non-euro area
countries and the pre-euro period. In case of countries like Denmark, Sweden, or the UK,
this allows us to compute common-currency yield spreads, even though those countries
are not members of the euro area. Drawing on earlier work by Bernoth et al. (2012), we
identify bonds denominated in either U.S. dollar or Deutsche mark of at least 5 years of
maturity issued by developed economies. We compute the yield spread for those bonds
relative to the yields of U.S. or German government bonds of comparable maturity and
coupon yield.9 Whenever possible, we aim to minimize the difference in coupon yield to 25
basis points and the difference in maturity to one year. In order to avoid artifacts because
trading dries up in the last days before redemption, we omit the last 30 trading days
before the earliest maturity date of either the benchmark or the government bond.10 In
case that several bonds are available for overlapping periods, we average over yield spreads
using the geometric mean. This procedure mimics the creation of the EMBI spreads and
the “long-term interest rate for convergence purposes”. However, we necessarily rely on
a smaller foreign currency bond universe and cannot correct for maturity drift. Thus,
we rely on the “long-term interest rate for convergence purposes” whenever they are
available.11
8The bonds used for computing the “long-term interest rate for convergence purposes” are typically
bonds issued in euro, but under national law. In this regard they differ from the securities on which the
EMBI is based, which are typically issued under international law. This difference becomes important
if the monetary union is believed to be reversible. In case of exit from the EMU, the euro bonds will
most likely be converted into domestic-currency bonds, implying that they should carry a redenomination
premium that is absent in case of international-law bonds. Still, even during the height of the European
debt crisis, the redenomination premium accounted for a moderate fraction of sovereign yield spreads
(Krishnamurthy et al., 2014; Kriwoluzky et al., 2015). In any case, our main results also hold for a sample
of emerging market countries.
9Yields on individual bonds are based on the yield to maturity at the midpoint as reported in
Bloomberg or the yield to redemption in Datastream.
10Still, in moving along the yield curve, we may pick up cross-country differences in the slope of the
yield curve. In principle, this effect can be quantitatively significant (Broner et al., 2013). However, as we
find our spread measure to co-move very strongly with CDS spreads (whenever they are available), we
ignore the issue in the present paper.
11By focusing on common-currency bonds, our spread measure is not affected by the convergence play
observed for nominal yield spreads prior to the introduction of the euro.
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Finally, in the more recent part of the sample, a direct measure of default risk has
become available in the form of CDS spreads. Credit default swaps are insurance contracts
that cover the repayment risk of an underlying bond. The CDS spread indicates the
annual insurance premium to be paid by the buyer.12 Accordingly, a higher perceived
default probability on the underlying bond implies, ceteris paribus, a higher CDS spread.
While well-suited to capture market assessment of debt sustainability, CDS spread data
are generally only available after 2003 (see Mengle, 2007). Unfortunately, trading in these
markets was often thin before the financial crisis, price discovery often took place in bond
markets, and CDS contracts are subject to counterparty risk (see Fontana and Scheicher,
2010). Thus, we use CDS spreads to measure default risk only when no spread-based
default premium measure is available.13
The use of CDS spreads also allows us to include the benchmark countries United
States (EMBI) and Germany (long-term convergence yields) in the sample. In order to
get an absolute measure of default risk for the other countries, we add the CDS spread of
the respective benchmark countries to the relative country spread. For the period before
CDS data are available, we add the value of the average CDS spread of the period prior to
the default of Lehman Brothers.14 Appendix A.3 provides an example of the construction
of our data set.
Table 2 provides basic descriptive statistics for our absolute default-premium measure.
The default premium st is measured in percentage points and varies considerably across
our sample from which we exclude periods of default (see the table note). In a couple of
euro-area countries the lowest realizations of the default premium are slightly negative.15
For the group of developed economies (see Table 2 for the classification), we observe the
highest premia in Portugal (12 pps) and Greece (10 pps). For emerging economies, the
12A no-arbitrage argument implies that the CDS spread should equal the spread between a par floating
rate bond and the risk-free rate (Duffie, 1999).
13The CDS data construction is described in Appendix A.1.2. The correlation between CDS spreads
and the yield-based default premium measures, when both are available, is typically above 0.9.
14Before the Lehman Brothers default, German and U.S. CDS were below 8 basis points and thus
virtually zero. After Lehman, they peak at about 70 basis points and slowly return to about 15 basis
points.
15The reason is that the long-term convergence yields are sometimes slightly lower than the German ones.
This is presumably due to their construction not controlling for different bond duration characteristics
and small maturity differences.
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Table 2: Basic properties of sovereign default premia
Country Group min max mean std ρ(∆yt, st) ρ(∆gt, st)
Argentina E 2.12 19.50 7.78 3.65 -0.55 -0.06
Australia D 0.03 1.30 0.31 0.31 -0.38 -0.39
Austria D 0.03 1.98 0.40 0.41 -0.47 -0.31
Belgium D 0.03 2.94 0.59 0.59 -0.42 -0.20
Brazil E 1.64 24.20 5.70 4.17 -0.05 -0.07
Bulgaria E 0.73 9.18 3.24 2.53 -0.11 -0.04
Chile E 0.62 4.04 1.60 0.63 -0.46 0.10
Colombia E 1.26 10.73 3.56 2.07 -0.40 -0.17
Croatia E 0.15 5.47 2.07 1.61 -0.66 -0.47
Czech Republic D 0.05 2.08 0.62 0.54 -0.83 -0.05
Denmark D 0.02 2.18 0.53 0.46 -0.20 -0.05
Ecuador E 5.09 21.20 9.86 4.07 -0.44 -0.36
El Salvador E 1.34 9.15 3.56 1.45 -0.75 0.04
Finland D -0.02 1.27 0.39 0.29 -0.50 -0.15
France D 0.03 2.03 0.44 0.46 -0.41 0.01
Germany D 0.02 0.73 0.20 0.18 -0.34 0.07
Greece D 0.18 10.02 1.49 2.58 -0.61 -0.21
Hungary E 0.17 6.37 2.00 1.75 -0.60 -0.05
Ireland D -0.02 9.09 1.41 2.15 -0.19 -0.39
Italy D -0.03 5.86 0.98 1.18 -0.42 -0.39
Latvia D 0.05 10.01 2.75 2.30 -0.72 -0.74
Lithuania D 0.06 7.25 2.32 1.83 -0.65 -0.23
Malaysia E 0.74 4.31 1.70 0.71 -0.65 -0.05
Mexico E 1.18 15.96 3.65 2.58 -0.28 -0.04
Netherlands D -0.01 1.18 0.34 0.32 -0.63 -0.28
Peru E 1.24 9.18 3.52 1.93 -0.26 0.02
Poland E 0.49 8.78 2.02 1.33 -0.05 -0.12
Portugal D 0.03 12.28 1.63 2.84 -0.45 -0.42
Slovakia D 0.04 4.10 1.22 1.21 -0.39 -0.23
Slovenia D -0.15 5.42 1.58 1.78 -0.47 -0.44
South Africa E 0.77 6.59 2.42 1.25 -0.54 -0.18
Spain D -0.03 5.40 0.95 1.35 -0.65 -0.45
Sweden D 0.01 1.20 0.39 0.24 -0.33 -0.07
Thailand E 0.27 5.62 1.38 0.92 -0.38 0.13
Turkey E 1.89 10.73 4.48 2.40 -0.33 -0.16
United Kingdom D 0.05 1.20 0.45 0.24 -0.43 -0.06
United States D 0.07 0.61 0.27 0.12 -0.48 0.12
Uruguay E 1.51 16.50 4.02 3.13 -0.42 -0.38
Notes: Default premium st is end-of-quarter observation, measured in percentage points. The last two
columns report the correlation of default premiums with the growth rates of real GDP, ∆yt, and government
consumption, ∆gt, respectively. Following IMF (2015, Tables B to D), group entry “D” denotes developed
economies, while “E” denotes emerging economies. Excludes default episodes in Argentina (2001Q4–
2005Q2), Ecuador (1999Q3–2000Q3 and 2008Q4–2009Q2), and Greece (2012Q1–2012Q2, 2012Q4) as
classified by Standard & Poor’s (see Chambers and Gurwitz, 2014, Table 2).
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Figure 2: Sovereign default premium: empirical cumulative density function (CDF).
Notes: horizontal axis measures the default premium in percentage points.
Vertical axis measures fraction of observations for which the default premium
is at most the value on the horizontal axis. Solid line displays CDF for full
sample, dashed-dotted line: developed economies only, dashed line: emerging
economies only.
highest values are reached in Brazil (24 pps), Ecuador (21 pps), and Argentina (20 pps).16
Compared to these values, most realizations of the default premium in our sample are
small. This is apparent from the CDF plotted in Figure 2 for the entire sample (solid
line), but also for the set of developed (dash-dotted line) and emerging economies (dashed
line) in isolation. The total number of observations in our sample is 2320, of which 1247
are for developed economies and 1073 for emerging economies. In each case, the mass of
observations is very much concentrated on the left. For the full sample about 50 percent
of the observations for the default premium are below 1 percentage point. Still, there are
considerable differences across the two country groups: 99.8 percent of observations are
below 10 percentage points in the sample of developed economies. The corresponding
number is only 95 percent in the sample of emerging-market economies.
Finally, in the last two columns of Table 2 we report the correlation of the sovereign
default premium with output growth and the growth of government consumption, respec-
tively. It turns out that the default premium is countercyclical in all countries, although
sometimes the correlation is negligible. In contrast, the within-country correlation of
16During default episodes, spreads in secondary markets can achieve even higher values. In case of
Argentina, the peak spread was 70 percentage points. Greek spreads were also higher shortly before and
during the defaults (2012Q1–2012Q2, 2012Q4), but these observations are not included in our sample,
because we lack high-quality national accounts data.
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the default premium and government consumption growth varies across countries. It is
negative for most of the countries, but often weakly so.
Eventually, we seek to establish the co-movement of the default premium and govern-
ment consumption conditional on an exogenous variation of government consumption. In
order to do so, we rely on specific identification assumptions which we discuss in what
follows.
3 Evidence from vector autoregressions
We now specify and estimate a vector autoregression (VAR) model as a first step towards
establishing the dynamic effects of austerity on the sovereign default premium. In section
4 we provide additional evidence based on local projections which offer, in some respects,
more flexibility than VARs. Yet, because VAR models are frequently employed to
characterize the fiscal transmission mechanism (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Mountford
and Uhlig, 2009; Ramey, 2011b), the VAR estimates provide a natural benchmark.
Moreover, for the medium to long term they tend to be more reliable than estimates based
on local projections (Ramey, 2012).
3.1 Model specification
We estimate a panel VAR model on the vector Xi,t which includes observations for each
quarter, indexed by t, for each country in our sample, indexed by i. In our baseline
specification, Xi,t includes the log of real government consumption, gi,t, the log of real
GDP, yi,t, and the quarter-on-quarter change of the sovereign default premium, ∆si,t.17
The model also includes country-specific constants and time trends, αi and βit, as well
as time-fixed effects, ηt, to control for common factors, such as variations in the price of
risk. Importantly, we permit the dynamics of the model to change smoothly, depending
on whether the economy operates closer to regime “A” or regime “B”. Formally, we rely
17We run a number of unit root tests on a country-by-country basis. They suggest the presence of a
unit root in case of the default premium, but not in case of real government consumption and real GDP.
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on a smooth transition VAR model:
Xi,t = αi + βit+ ηt + F (zi,t)ΛA(L)Xi,t−1 + [1− F (zi,t)] ΛB(L)Xi,t−1 + νi,t , (3.1)
where Λ∗(L), ∗ ∈ {A,B}, is a lag polynomial which features four lags and νi,t is a
vector of normally distributed errors with regime-dependent covariance matrix Ωt =
ΩAF (zi,t) + [1− F (zi,t)] ΩB.18
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) have popularized smooth transition VAR models
for the analysis of the fiscal transmission mechanism. However, while their focus is on
how this transmission mechanism changes with the business cycle, we are interested in the
impact of “fiscal stress” on fiscal policy transmission. Formally, we weight the polynomials
Λ∗(L) on the basis of the function F (zi,t). We restrict function values to fall in the unit
interval and let it be determined by the indicator variable zi,t for which we use the lagged
default premium, si,t−1. If fiscal stress is at its maximum, we set F (zi,t) = 1, such that
the model dynamics depend exclusively on regime “A”. Conversely, in the absence of fiscal
stress, regime “B” obtains. It is quite unlikely, however, that actual economies operate in
either of these two polar regimes. This notion is captured in the estimation, as, for each
observation, the impact of the regressors is a weighted average of the dynamics in the two
regimes. As a result, all observations contribute to identifying the dynamics that govern
in the polar regimes.
The weighting function is critical in this regard. Given that our estimation is based on
a fairly large sample, we can rely on the empirical cumulative distribution function of the
sovereign default premium in order to determine F , see Figure 2 above. Formally, we have
F (zi,t) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
1zj<zi,t , (3.2)
where, again, zi,t = si,t−1. 1 is an indicator function and j indexes all country-time
observations, separately for the group of advanced and emerging economies (baseline).
Figures A.2 to A.4 in the appendix show how the implied function values vary over time
for each country. Alternatively, one may postulate a specific parametric function (e.g.
18Using four lags is broadly in line with what information criteria recommend. Results are robust to
variations of the lag length.
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Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012). Using the empirical CDF as the weighting function
has two advantages, however. First, we may remain agnostic and do not impose any
parametric restrictions. Second, extreme values are given by observations which actually
materialize in sample.19
Given the weighting function (3.2) we estimate the VAR model (3.1) by maximizing
its likelihood. Because of the nonlinear specification and the large number of parameters
to be estimated, we employ the Tailored Randomized Block Metropolis-Hastings algorithm
to sample from the parameter distribution (Chib and Ramamurthy, 2010).
We compute impulse responses recursively on the basis of the estimated VAR model.
In doing so, we kept track of the function value of F , which changes with the endogenous
variation of the default premium.20 Finally, we note that for some variables it is of
particular interest to assess their long-run response to fiscal shocks. If a variable is
included in Xi,t in levels, the impulse response will typically be zero in the long run,
because estimating a root to be exactly at 1 is a zero probability event. Instead, by
including a variable in first differences, we maintain the hypothesis that its dynamics
are governed by a unit root. We may then check whether the cumulative response is
significantly different from zero in the long run. Confidence bands are obtained by sampling
from the parameter distribution provided by the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.
3.2 Identification
We follow Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and many others and assume that, within a given
quarter, government consumption is predetermined. This assumption is plausible because
exhaustive government consumption is unlikely a) to respond automatically to the cycle
and b) to be adjusted instantaneously in a discretionary manner by policymakers. To see
this, recall that government consumption, unlike transfers, is not composed of cyclical items
19One may argue that only governments with relatively large financing needs issue foreign currency
bonds and thus appear in our sample. As a consequence, our empirical CDF for fiscal stress may be
skewed to extreme observations: those countries with large debt and thus default premium and euro area
countries with historically low default premium observations. We check the robustness of our results by
also using a parametric logistic transition function and find that they are robust.
20We map the default premium into weights according to the CDF for the full sample, because we
cannot distinguish between emerging and developed economies in computing impulse responses.
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and, in addition, discretionary changes of government spending are subject to decision
lags that prevent policymakers from responding to contemporaneous developments in the
economy, notably changes in output and the sovereign default premium.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that this holds true also in times of fiscal stress.21 Still,
we cannot rule out that policy measures—while debated for some time—are sometimes
spurred by contemporaneous financial-market developments.22 Against this background,
we exploit the specific panel structure of our data set and assess whether policy makers
adjust government consumption systematically in response to contemporaneous movements
of the sovereign default premium. In particular, in Section 4 we isolate the common
component of the sovereign default premium in the cross-section of our panel. We find
that it induces the country-specific component of the premium to move strongly on
impact, but government consumption with a significant delay only. Hence, we maintain
our identification assumption with some confidence.
To impose our identification assumption that government consumption is predetermined
relative to the other variables included in the model, we order government spending first
in Xi,t and equate the first element in νi,t with a structural fiscal shock. As a practical
matter, we assume a lower-triangular matrix B which maps reduced-form innovations νi,t
into structural shocks εi,t = Bνi,t. We attach no structural interpretation to the other
elements in εi,t.
Influential work by Ramey (2011b) and Leeper et al. (2013) has clarified a potential
limitation of our identification strategy: if fiscal policy measures are anticipated by
21For instance, in November 2009, European Commission (2009) stated regarding Greece: “in its
recommendations of 27 April 2009 . . . the Council [of the European Union] did not consider the measures
already announced by that time, to be sufficient to achieve the 2009 deficit target and recommended to
the Greek authorities to “strengthen the fiscal adjustment in 2009 through permanent measures, mainly
on the expenditure side”. In response to these recommendations the Greek government announced, on 25
June 2009, an additional set of fiscal measures to be implemented in 2009 . . . . However, these measures
. . . have not been implemented by the Greek authorities so far.” In fact, it appears that significant
measures were put in place not before 2010Q1, see Greek Ministry of Finance (2010).
22Consider the case of Italy: after some fiscal consolidation in 2010, the default premium kept on
rising during the first quarter of 2011 and additional measures were approved by the cabinet on June 30.
Finance minister Tremonti, in particular, pushed for severe austerity measures in order to “dispel any
spectre of a Greek collapse in Italy” (The Economist, 2011). On July 8 prime minister Berlusconi stated
that his finance minister “thinks he’s a genius and everyone else is stupid”, suggesting some modification
to the austerity package. Arguably in response to these remarks, yields on Italian debt rose strongly, such
that the package was approved in the Senate without much debate on July 14 (Time Magazine, 2011).
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market participants, say, because it takes time to pass legislation or because of other
implementation lags, it may fail to uncover the true effect of such measures. Still, because
our VAR model includes an inherently forward-looking variable, namely the sovereign
default premium, potential problems due to fiscal foresight are likely to be less severe
(Sims, 2012). That being said, in Section 4.3, we also consider a variant of our model that
features forecast errors of government consumption rather than government consumption
itself. As a result, innovations of government consumption are purged of any components
which are anticipated by market participants.
Another popular strategy to identify fiscal shocks is the narrative approach. Following
the work of Romer and Romer (2010) for the U.S., Devries et al. (2011) have constructed
a data set of fiscal measures for a sample of OECD countries. These fiscal policy measures
are identified as being orthogonal to the business cycle on narrative grounds. A large
number of these measures are taken in order to reign in public debt or budget deficits.
Because sovereign default premia co-move systematically with the latter, such “shocks” are
ill-suited to investigate the effect of fiscal policy on the sovereign default premium. Finally,
identification based on sign restrictions is not feasible in the context of our analysis,
because few of the responses of the variables in our VAR model are uncontroversial as far
as fiscal shocks are concerned.
3.3 Results
We now report results for our baseline VAR model. Recall that we adopt a parsimonious
specification, which features four lags of the endogenous variables real government con-
sumption, real GDP, and the quarter-on-quarter change of the sovereign default premium.
Figure 3 displays the impulse response to a cut of government consumption by 1 percent.
Here and in what follows, horizontal axes measure quarters, while vertical axes measure
the deviation from the pre-shock path, in percent for government spending and output
and in terms of basis points for the default premium (for which we display the cumulative
response of the quarter-on-quarter change). Solid and dashed lines indicate the point
estimates, shaded areas and dotted lines indicate 90 percent confidence bounds. Note
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(a) Unconditional VAR (short horizon)
Government consumption
0 5 10 15 20
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
Stress
No stress
GDP
0 5 10 15 20
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
Default premium (basis points)
0 5 10 15 20
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
(b) Conditional: fiscal stress vs. no stress (short horizon)
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(c) Conditional: fiscal stress vs. no stress (long horizon)
Figure 3: Dynamic response to an exogenous cut of government consumption by 1
percent: unconditional response (top) vs conditional on initial conditions
(middle and bottom). Notes: horizonal axis measures quarters, vertical axis
measures deviation from pre-shock path in percent and basis points (default
premium). Shaded areas and dotted lines indicate 90 percent confidence
bounds.
that our baseline estimates are based on group-specific weighting functions (developed vs
emerging economies).
Panel (a) shows responses when the VAR model (3.1) is estimated without conditioning
on fiscal stress, that is, the coefficient matrices in regimes A and B are restricted to be
equal. The response of government spending, shown on the left, is fairly persistent. The
maximum output effect obtains in the third quarter after the shock: the decline of output
implies a (maximum) multiplier of about 0.7 percent, a value roughly in line with earlier
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findings (see, for a survey, Ramey, 2011a). The response of the sovereign default premium
is shown on the right. The premium increases during the first two years after impact. It
declines significantly and below the pre-shock level afterwards. In this sense austerity
does pays off—but only in the long run. That a cut of government consumption causes
the sovereign default premium to rise in the short run may come as a surprise. Yet we
are able to offer a structural interpretation of this finding in Section 5 below. In what
follows, we first establish to what extent this result obtains consistently and under which
conditions.
We begin with the role of fiscal stress. Specifically, in panel (b) of Figure 3 we show
results for the smooth transition VAR model—displaying impulse responses for the limiting
cases when there is initially no fiscal stress (F = 0, solid lines) and the maximum level of
fiscal stress (F = 1, dashed lines). The dynamic adjustment differs substantially across
the two scenarios. In the absence of fiscal stress, government consumption is less persistent
and there is no significant effect on output and the default premium. In contrast, relative
to the results shown in panel (a), the output effect is much amplified in case of fiscal
stress. The same holds true for the default premium: as in panel (a), it rises initially in
the presence of fiscal stress—only to decline significantly below its pre-shock level between
one and two years after the shock. Overall, the dynamic adjustment of the economy under
fiscal stress resembles that implied by the unconditional estimates. Instead, in the absence
of fiscal stress there is not much of an effect.
The results reported in panel (c) are based on the same specification as the results
shown in panel (b). Yet in panel (c) we show results for a longer horizon. We observe the
default premium plateaus after about 30 quarters and settles on a permanently lower level.
Relative to the pre-shock level we find the premium reduced by some 17 basis points in
the long-run. This effect is statistically significant, too.
Our VAR model provides an efficient framework to study the long-run effects of fiscal
shocks which turn out to conform well with the received wisdom. In what follows we
further explore the short-run dynamics, because they are (perhaps) somewhat surprising.
For this purpose we rely on local projections, as they offer more flexibility than VARs.
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4 Evidence from local projections
We now turn to local projections, as introduced by Jordá (2005). They are quite flexible in
accommodating a panel structure and offer a straightforward way to condition the short-
run effects of fiscal shocks on the presence of fiscal stress. In addition, local projections
allow us to assess to what extent the response of the sovereign default premium to fiscal
shocks changes disproportionately in their size. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013),
Owyang et al. (2013), and Ramey and Zubairy (2014) also rely on local projections. Their
focus, however, is on the fiscal multiplier and on whether it changes with the business
cycle and/or the level of nominal interest rates.
4.1 Model specification and identification
In what follows, we are explicit about how the local projection relates to the VAR model
employed in Section 3, notably in terms of identification. Specifically, we postulate
the same model for government consumption, but do not impose any cross-equation
restrictions. We also maintain the identification assumptions introduced in Section 3.2
above. Formally, we rely on the following model:
gi,t = F (zi,t) ΓA(L)Xi,t−1 + [1− F (zi,t)] ΓB(L)Xi,t−1 + εgi,t . (4.1)
Here Xi,t is a vector of regressors with gi,t ∈ Xi,t and, as before, ΓA(L) and ΓB(L) are
lag polynomials of coefficient matrices capturing the dynamic effect of the regressors
in each regime. Deterministic terms are omitted to simplify the exposition. Under the
assumption that government consumption is predetermined, εgi,t is a structural innovation
to government consumption.
Eventually, we are interested in the dynamic effects of this innovation. Formally,
letting xi,t+h denote the response of a particular variable at horizon h to an innovation at
time t, we seek to retrieve the following relation:
xi,t+h = αi,h + βi,ht+ ηt,h + F (zi,t)ψA,hεgi,t + [1− F (zi,t)]ψB,hεgi,t + ui,t+h . (4.2)
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Here αi,h and βi,ht are a country-specific constant and a country-specific trend, respectively,
and ηt,h captures time-fixed effects. Also, at each horizon, the response of the dependent
variable to the fiscal innovation is allowed to differ across regimes “A” and “B”, with
the ψ-coefficients on the εgi,t terms indexed accordingly. F (zi,t) captures fiscal stress as
explained in Section 3.1. The error term ui,t+h is assumed to have a zero mean and strictly
positive variance.
The innovation εgi,t is generally not observable. We therefore rearrange (4.1) and
substitute in (4.2) to obtain the following regression equation
xi,t+h = αi,h + βi,ht+ ηt,h
+ F (zi,t)ψA,hgi,t + [1− F (zi,t)]ψB,hgi,t
− ψA,hΓA,h(L) [F (zi,t)]2Xt−1 − ψB,hΓB,h(L) [1− F (zi,t)]2Xt−1
− ψA,hΓB,h(L)F (zi,t) [1− F (zi,t)]Xt−1 − ψB,hΓA,h(L)F (zi,t) [1− F (zi,t)]Xt−1
+ ui,t+h .
(4.3)
We estimate (4.3) using OLS where, in order to improve the efficiency of the estimates,
we include the residual of the local projection at t+h− 1 as an additional regressor in the
regression for t+ h (see Jordá, 2005). For each forecast horizon, the sample is adjusted
accordingly to use all available country-quarter observations.
Projection (4.3) directly captures the dynamic effects of a fiscal innovation conditional
on the circumstances under which it occurs. Formally, the response in period t+ h to a
government consumption impulse in period t, εgi,t, conditional on the economy experiencing
a particular state today, indexed by zi,t, is given by the regression coefficients on gi,t in
equation (4.3):
∂xi,t+h
∂gi,t
∣∣∣∣∣
zi,t
= F (zi,t)ψA,h + [1− F (zi,t)]ψB,h . (4.4)
This expression illustrates that computing impulse responses based on a single-equation
approach does not require us to make additional assumptions on the economy staying in
a particular regime (see also the discussion in Ramey and Zubairy, 2014). Rather, the
local projection at time t directly provides us with the average response of an economy
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in state zi,t going forward. Note also that equation (4.4) is just a linear combination of
regression coefficients. We can thus rely on a Wald-type test to assess whether responses
at a particular horizon are significantly different from each other as a result of different
initial conditions.
4.2 Projections on government consumption
We estimate the local projection (4.3) on the full sample, using again four lags of govern-
ment consumption, GDP, and the default premium.23 We obtain the impulse responses
to a shock of government consumption for all three variables, allowing for a maximum
horizon of h = 8 quarters. Extending the horizon comes at the expense of degrees of
freedom in the time-series dimension and estimates tend to be less reliable at longer
horizons (Ramey, 2012). The size of the shock corresponds to one percent of government
consumption. Figure 4 shows the results. As before, shaded areas and dotted lines indicate
90 percent confidence bounds, based on standard errors which are robust with respect
to heteroskedasticity as well as serial and cross-sectional correlation (Driscoll and Kraay,
1998).
Panel (a) of Figure 4 displays the estimates obtained without conditioning on fiscal
stress. Government consumption, shown on the left, remains depressed for an extended
period, but eventually returns to its pre-shock level. The response of GDP, displayed in the
middle, declines initially by about 0.1 percent, and more strongly thereafter. The strongest
effect of about −0.15 obtains after roughly 1.5 years. On the right, we show the response
of the default premium: it increases in response to the cut of government consumption.
The impact and maximum response is about 2 and 4 basis points, respectively. Overall,
the results are quite similar to the unconditional effects obtained from the VAR model,
displayed in panel (a) of Figure 3.
Panel (b) shows results conditional on initial conditions in terms of fiscal stress. Solid
lines represent point estimates, provided that there is no fiscal stress. Dashed lines
represent the results conditional on the presence of fiscal stress. It turns out that, as
23We include the default premium in levels, as we focus on the short run. Using first differences instead
yields almost identical results for the implied response of the default premium.
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(a) Response to cut of government consumption: unconditional
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(b) Response to cut of government consumption: conditional on initial conditions
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(c) Response to increase of common factor of default premium: conditional on initial conditions
Figure 4: Dynamic responses. Notes: panels (a) and (b) show impulse responses to
cut of government consumption by 1 percent; panel (c) shows responses to
1 percentage point increase of the common factor of the sovereign default
premium. Horizonal axis measures quarters, vertical axis measures deviation
from pre-shock path in percent and basis points (default premium). Shaded
areas and dotted lines indicate 90 percent confidence bounds.
with the VAR estimates, differences across regimes are rather stark. Neither output nor
the default premium respond much to the shock in the absence of fiscal stress. Output,
however, falls strongly and the premium rises sharply if government consumption is
cut in times of fiscal stress. The impact and peak responses of the default premium
are summarized in Table 3. We also check whether the responses in both regimes are
statistically different from each other. According to a Wald test, the null hypothesis of
an equal response can generally be rejected for output and the default premium at all
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Table 3: Impact, peak, and long-run response of default premium (basis points)
Local projection VAR
Impact Peak Short-run peak Long run
Unconditional 2 4 5 -6
Fiscal stress 4 7 3 -17
No stress -1 -3 -1 1
Notes: Response to a 1 percent cut of government consumption. The short-run peak is the maximum of
the absolute value of the response of the default premium during the first 8 quarters.
horizons. The null is not rejected for government consumption.
Table 3 also shows that our main result is robust across different model specifications:
a cut of government consumption raises the sovereign default premium in the short run,
provided that fiscal stress is high. To the extent that this finding is surprising, it may raise
doubts about the identification assumption which we entertain throughout, namely, that
government consumption is predetermined within the quarter. After all, results might
be driven by reverse causality: as the sovereign default premium rises, governments may
immediately cut public consumption to calm financial markets.
The panel structure of our data set allows us to assess this conjecture formally. For this
purpose, we first extract a common factor in the default premium along the cross-sectional
dimension of our panel by means of a principal component analysis (see Longstaff et al.,
2011, for a similar approach). We conduct the analysis separately for developed and
emerging economies.24 In a second step, we run a local projection on our panel, relating
current and future government consumption in each country (as well as output and default
premium) on the common factor. Here identification rests on the assumption that the
common factor—variations of which may, for instance, reflect changes in the stochastic
discount factor of global investors—is not contemporaneously affected by country-specific
developments.
We condition the effects on the presence of fiscal stress as above and show results for
24As a practical matter, to deal with the missing values in our panel, we conduct a “Probabilistic
principal component analysis” as implemented in Matlab 2015b’s ppca-command. To find the global
mode of the likelihood function, we run the analysis with random starting values and keep those for which
we obtain the highest likelihood. The sample starts in 1994Q4 for emerging economies and in 1991Q4
for developed economies. We exclude time-fixed effects from the local projections including the common
factor.
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an increase of the common factor by 1 percentage point in panel (c) of Figure 4. There is
no significant response of government consumption in the very short run. If there is fiscal
stress, government consumption is reduced, as the common factor increases, but only with
a delay of 2 or 3 quarters. We explore this finding in more detail in ongoing work (Born
et al., 2016). The delayed response of government consumption is particularly remarkable,
because output and the sovereign default premium tend to respond instantaneously to the
common factor. In light of these results, we judge concerns that our main finding—the
short-run response of the default premium to a cut of government consumption—is the
result of reverse causality as unwarranted.
4.3 Projections on forecast errors of government consumption
Our baseline model assumes that innovations of government consumption are a surprise
to market participants. To the extent that this assumption fails to be satisfied in actual
time-series data, estimates are biased (Leeper et al., 2013; Ramey, 2011b). To address this
issue we follow Ramey (2011b) and construct a measure of fiscal shocks which is purged
of possible anticipation effects, namely the forecast error of government consumption.
The OECD compiles semiannual forecasts of government consumption, covering the
period from 1986 to 2014 for an unbalanced panel of OECD countries. Forecasts are
prepared at the end of an observation period, namely, in June and December of each year
and tend to perform quite well (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012). In what follows, we
aggregate the quarterly observations in our sample to obtain observations at semi-annual
frequency. We evaluate the weighting function F using the end-of-period values of the
(lagged) default premium. Regarding the forecast errors of government consumption, we
compute growth rates rather than levels, because the OECD changes the base year several
times during our sample period. Our transformed sample consists of 697 semi-annual
observations.
We estimate the local projection (4.3) on this sample, replacing the level of govern-
ment consumption gi,t with the period-t forecast error of the growth rate of government
consumption, while still including the lags of government consumption as controls. The
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Figure 5: Dynamic response of sovereign default premium to change of government
consumption: projection on forecast errors using semi-annual observations.
Horizontal axis measures half years. Solid lines: responses conditional on
absence of fiscal stress; dashed lines: fiscal stress; dash-dotted lines: response
conditional on change of government consumption larger than 2 standard
errors (assuming fiscal stress). Shock size normalized to one percent of govern-
ment consumption in all cases. Left: symmetric model; middle: government
consumption decrease; right: government consumption increase.
response of the sovereign default premium is shown on the left of Figure 5. It is quite
similar to that shown in Figure 4, despite of differences in the sample, the sampling
frequency, and despite of the correction for anticipation effects.25
Given our findings for fiscal stress, one may wonder whether raising government
consumption is a means to reduce the sovereign default premium. After all, local projection
(4.3) restricts the responses to increases and decreases of government consumption to be
symmetric. In what follows, we relax this restriction and estimate (4.3) while treating
spending cuts and spending hikes as distinct regressors. Figure 5 shows the results: the
response to a spending cut is shown in the middle, while the response to a spending increase
is shown on the right. Allowing for asymmetric effects turns out to be important: in times
of fiscal stress, the default premium responds strongly only if government consumption
is cut. The response to a spending increase, on the other hand, is muted—both in the
presence of fiscal stress and in the absence thereof.
The effects of changes of government consumption may more generally depend on its
size (Giavazzi et al., 2000). In order to assess this possibility we include an interaction
term in the local projection (4.3): it interacts the shock with a dummy variable which is
25Figure A.5 in the appendix contrasts the results for forecast errors and for government spending
based on an identical sample. Results are very similar across both specifications, also from a quantitative
point of view. This confirms earlier findings by Beetsma and Giuliodori (2011), Born et al. (2013), and
Corsetti et al. (2012b).
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Table 4: Response of sovereign default premium (basis points), forecast error identifica-
tion, semi-annual observations
Baseline: spending cut in symmetric model
Stress No stress Difference
Impact 9 -8 17∗
Maximum (stress) 31 -14 46∗
Controlling for sign: spending cut
Stress No stress Difference
Impact 23 4 19
Maximum (stress) 66 -23 89∗
Controlling for sign: cut vs hike (fiscal stress)
Spending cut Spending hike*(-1) Difference
Impact 23 7 16
Maximum (cut) 66 13 46∗
Controlling for size: baseline vs large spending (fiscal stress)
Spending cut Large spending cut Difference
Impact 23 29 6
Maximum (large cut) 66 114 48∗
Notes: Results based on model (4.3) and on sample for which forecasts of government consumption are
available; shock size normalized to one percent of government consumption in all cases (see footnote
(26)). Maximum response under stress/cut/large cut (> 2 SE) is compared to response in the absence
of stress/increase/cut at same horizon. An asterisk indicates significance at the 5 percent level. In the
bottom panel, the test of significance of the difference is based on the model which includes an interaction
term (see main text).
one whenever the shock is larger than two standard deviations (on a country-by-country
basis). We focus our analysis on the case where fiscal stress is present and find that size
indeed matters. Large spending cuts raise the default premium more than proportionally,
as illustrated by the dashed-dotted line in panel (b) of Figure 5.26 The figure also shows
that the effect is not present in the symmetric model or in case of spending hikes.
Table 4 summarizes how changes of government consumption impact the default
premium. Importantly, it shows the difference of the response due to various conditioning
26To ensure comparability across different shock sizes, all panels report IRFs to a shock of 1 percent of
government consumption, although the average shock size is actually different.
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factors, both for the impact and the maximum effect. First, the premium rises in the
short run only if there is “fiscal stress” (upper panel). Second, while cutting government
consumption in times of fiscal stress increases the default premium, a spending hike in
this situation leaves it basically unchanged (second panel). Third, under fiscal stress, large
austerity programs have a more than proportional effect on the premium in the short run
(fourth panel). These differences are statistically significant in most cases (always when
considering the maximum effects).
4.4 Sensitivity analysis
We explore the robustness of our findings across a range of alternative specifications
and subsets of country-time observations. In what follows we briefly discuss results and
relegate figures to the appendix. Unless stated otherwise, our point of departure is the
local projection (4.3) with government consumption as regressor, since the sample is
largest for this specification.
Additional variables
Our baseline specification is parsimonious, because earlier studies of the fiscal transmission
mechanism suggest that including additional variables in the model has little effect on the
results (e.g., Born and Müller, 2012). In what follows we nevertheless include a number of
additional variables in the local projection. In doing so, we not only assess the robustness
of our results, but also shed further light on the transmission mechanism. A first set of
additional variables includes the debt-to-GDP ratio, government net lending relative to
GDP, private consumption, and private investment. We include each variable, in turn, in
Xi,t and project them on government consumption. Note that due to data availability,
the number of observations is somewhat reduced relative to the baseline.
The panels in Figure A.6 in the appendix show results. On the left and in the middle
of each panel, we show the impulse responses of output and the sovereign default premium,
respectively. They turn out to be quite similar to those obtained for the baseline model.
On the right of each panel, we show the impulse responses of the additional variable.
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Responses vary considerably depending on whether there is fiscal stress or not. The
responses of debt and the government budget are particularly informative: debt relative
to output rises in response to a spending cut, if fiscal stress is high. It declines, albeit
very gradually, in the absence of stress. Similarly, after a cut of government consumption,
net lending increases relative to output only in the absence of fiscal stress.
We also consider variations of the baseline model which include, in turn, confidence
and stock market returns as additional variables. Confidence data is provided by the Ifo
World Economic Survey (WES), which surveys a number of experts for all countries in
our sample.27 Earlier research on the consequences of fiscal consolidations has argued
that its impact on “confidence” is crucial (see, for instance, the discussion in Perotti,
2013). Bachmann and Sims (2012) find that confidence responds strongly to fiscal shocks
during periods of economic slack. Also, both confidence and stock market returns are
forward-looking variables and may thus control for fiscal foresight. Results are shown in
Figure A.7: the responses of output and the default premium are again fairly unchanged
relative to the baseline model. The responses of confidence and stock market returns are
not significantly different from zero—irrespective of initial conditions.
Cross-sectional heterogeneity
The central theme of our analysis is that the effects of fiscal policy differ along a number
of important dimensions. Still, even after accounting for these (as well as for country
and time-fixed effects) there may still be important cross-sectional heterogeneity across
countries which is unaccounted for in our baseline model. As a first step to address this
concern, we consider a number of sample splits: a sample that includes only euro area
countries, a sample of euro area periphery countries which were hit hardest by the crisis
(Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain), and a sample of the remaining euro
area countries.
Results, shown in Figure A.8, tend to be qualitatively similar to those obtained for the
27Respondents are asked to classify their expectations for the next six months using a grid ranging
from 1 (deterioration) to 9 (improvement). 5 indicates that expectations are “satisfactory” (see, e.g.,
Kudymowa et al., 2014).
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full sample—notably in terms of the differential impact of fiscal stress. The same holds
for sub-samples comprising developed and emerging economies only, see panels (a) and (b)
of Figure A.9. As a caveat, however, we note that there are sizeable differences in some
instances, partially reflecting a strong decline in sample size. Similarly, we rule out that
results are driven by the Great Recession and report estimates for the pre-2007Q3 period
in panel (c) of Figure A.9.
A second, more formal approach to control for cross-sectional heterogeneity is to
employ a mean-group estimator (Pesaran and Smith, 1995). In this case we estimate
model (4.3) for each country separately and average over the cross section of coefficients
afterwards. As this leaves us with few degrees of freedom, we only estimate the model
without conditioning on fiscal stress and use the panel model with slope homogeneity
as our benchmark. Figure A.10(a) shows that our results are robust to allowing for
cross-sectional heterogeneity in parameters.
Independent monetary policy
Some observers have argued that the sovereign default premium, notably during the recent
euro area crisis, is driven by “market sentiment” rather than “fundamentals” . According
to a popular narrative, the fact that euro area countries have surrendered monetary
independence is crucial in this regard (see, e.g., De Grauwe and Ji, 2012). Independent
central banks, so the argument goes, can act as a lender of last resort to governments
and thereby rule out speculative runs on governments (see Farhi et al., 2013, for a formal
treatment). Hence, whether a central bank is independent or not may matter for the
dynamics of the default premium, at least the one paid on domestic-currency debt. Yet,
by reducing the likelihood of runs on domestic debt, it is likely that there are spillover
effects on the default premium paid on foreign-currency debt, too.
To explore whether this aspect matters for our results, we identify those countries in
our sample which are either members of a monetary union or have officially dollarized.28
Figure A.10 shows the results for this group of countries in panel (b) and results for
28Ecuador since 2000Q1 and El Salvador since 2001Q1 use the dollar as their official legal tender (see
Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2002).
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countries with their own legal tender in panel (c). We find that conditioning on monetary
independence has little bearing on our results, although the response of the default
premium tends to be weaker in countries with their own legal tender.
Sample without IMF program countries
Austerity programs are frequently part of the conditionality of IMF assistance which is
typically called upon when the sovereign default premium is high. To ensure that our
results are not driven by such episodes, we drop all observations for which a country
qualifies as an IMF “program country”. We rely on the IMF’s “History of Lending
Arrangements” and classify countries as “program countries” if there is either a “Standby
Arrangement” or an “Extended Fund Facility”. Results are quite similar to those for the
baseline sample. They are shown in panel (d) of Figure A.10.
Measurement of default premium
In our baseline specification we measure the default premium in basis points. Benign
times are effectively characterized by a premium of close to zero. Impulse responses
computed for the absence of fiscal stress may therefore imply that the premium becomes
potentially negative. Economically this makes little sense. We therefore consider an
alternative specification where the premium is measured in logs. The results, shown in
Figure A.11(a), are qualitatively similar, with the premium in the absence of fiscal stress
roughly constant.
Data quality
Our sample includes observations for European countries in the 1990s. These data do
not fully meet the more recent standards for the compilation of quarterly non-financial
accounts of the government (see, e.g., Eurostat, 2011). As a robustness check, we therefore
estimate our model on a conservative subsample where the data quality is higher.29 Results
29We checked with national statistical agencies and adjusted the Ilzetzki et al. (2013) sample where
necessary. Using this conservative sample eliminates about 10% of our observations for developed
economies.
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are shown in Figure A.11(b). They are very similar to our baseline sample.
Boom and recessions
Times of fiscal stress are most likely times of low output growth. The converse is not
true: a recession does not necessarily give rise to fiscal stress. Still, to put our results into
perspective, it is useful to assess to what extent the effects of fiscal shocks on the default
premium change with the state of the business cycle. For this purpose, we estimate a
variant of model (4.3) while conditioning on the state of the cycle (rather than fiscal
stress). In this case we follow Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013) and use a measure of
the output gap as indicator variable zit. However, in contrast to their analysis, we rely on
the empirical cumulative distribution function to weigh regressors.30
Figure A.11(c) shows the results. In line with earlier findings by Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2013), we find that the output effects of fiscal policy are considerably
stronger during recessions. We also find that the default premium increases during
recessions and falls during booms in response to cuts of government consumption. We thus
obtain a pattern of responses quite comparable to those once we condition on fiscal stress.
Perhaps surprisingly, while conditioning on fiscal stress and recessions yields very similar
results, we find that the overlap of stress and recession episodes is far from complete. In
particular, the correlation of the empirical CDF is only moderate (see Table A.1 and
Figures A.2 to A.4 in the appendix.).
5 Interpretation
Our empirical analysis reveals a robust pattern: a cut of government consumption raises
the sovereign default premium in the short run—provided that fiscal stress is high. We
rationalize this finding within a structural model of sovereign default à la Arellano (2008).
In order to keep the analysis as transparent and focused, we modify the original model as
30To obtain a measure for the output gap, we compute a five-quarter moving average of the first
difference of log output. The resulting series is then z-scored and filtered using an Hodrick-Prescott filter
with smoothing parameter λ = 160,000. This is the value used in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013),
adjusted for our quarterly sample following Ravn and Uhlig (2002).
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little as possible. Specifically, to capture key aspects of our empirical setup, we depart
from the original model by allowing for (a) exogenous variations in government spending
and (b) a multiplier effect of such variations on output. The model features stationary
dynamics, as all variables converge to an ergodic mean. It is thus suited for an analysis of
the short-run dynamics only. In what follows, we briefly outline the small open economy.
The government engages in intertemporal trade, as it seeks to maximize the expected
utility of the representative household given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(ct) . (5.1)
Here, 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor and ct is private consumption. Output yt is given
by
yt = y¯eµgˆt , (5.2)
where y¯ is a positive constant and gˆt is the percentage deviation of government consumption
from its long-run value g¯. We abstract from variations in output due to other factors.
Government consumption varies exogenously and impacts household utility additively
separable from ct. Hence, we omit it from the exposition in (5.1). Parameter µ in the
expression above is given by (g¯/y¯), where  measures the fiscal multiplier, that is, the
percentage change of output, given an increase of government consumption equal to one
percent of GDP.31
The government sells debt to risk-neutral, international investors. It cannot commit
to repay, but decides in a discretionary manner on whether to service the outstanding
debt or not in each period. In case it repays, the flow budget constraint of the economy is
given by
yt + (1 + rt)−1dt+1 − dt = ct + g¯egˆt , (5.3)
where dt is beginning-of-period debt, dt+1 is newly issued debt which pays one unit of
output in the next period if it is redeemed. It trades at a discount (1 + rt)−1. The absence
31We skip a possible microfoundation of the multiplier based on, for instance, endogenous labor supply
or a working capital constraint in order keep the analysis tractable. Mendoza and Yue (2012) develop a
model of optimal sovereign default and endogenous output determination.
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of arbitrage possibilities requires the following condition to be satisfied
1 + rt =
1 + r
1− δt . (5.4)
Here δt is the probability of default and r is a risk-free return which international investors
earn elsewhere. Investors are assumed to form expectations rationally, that is, they
understand the determinants of the default decision which we discuss below. We also
assume that investors do not receive any payment in case of default. The sovereign default
premium is given by rt − r.
In the event of default the country is excluded from international financial markets. It
may be allowed to reenter financial markets with probability θ in each period thereafter.
In addition, there is an asymmetric output cost, such that output is given by
ydeft = min(yt, y¯def) (5.5)
as long as the country remains in the default state. Here y¯def is a constant defining the
maximum output level. Consumption in the default state is then given by
cdeft = ydeft − g¯egˆt . (5.6)
To characterize the decision problem of a government that enters the current period
with debt dt and government spending gt, it is useful to define the value of having the
option to default, vo(dt, gt), as follows
vo(dt, gt) = max{ct,def}
{
vc(dt, gt), vdef(gt)
}
. (5.7)
Here, vc(dt, gt) is the continuation value associated with not defaulting, while vdef(gt) is
the value of repudiating debt. Setting dt+1 = 0, is is defined recursively as
vdef(gt) = U(cdeft ) + β
∫
gt+1
[
θvo(0, gt+1) + (1− θ)vdef(gt+1)
]
f(gt+1, gt)dgt+1 . (5.8)
Here gt+1 denotes next period’s government consumption. The continuation value of not
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defaulting, in turn, is given by
vc(dt, gt) = max{dt+1}
{
u (yt + q(dt+1, gt)dt+1 − dt − gt)
+ β
∫
gt+1
vo(dt+1, gt+1)f(gt+1, gt)dgt+1
}
.
(5.9)
Hence, exactly as in Arellano (2008), the government decides on the optimal level of
borrowing and on whether to repay in order to maximize household utility. In doing so,
it is also constrained not to run Ponzi schemes. We skip the definition of a recursive
equilibrium, because it is isomorphic to the one in Arellano (2008).
Also, rather than providing a full-fledged analysis of the model, we focus on how the
default premium reacts to exogenous variations of government consumption. For our
model simulation, we assume U(ct) = c1−σt /(1− σ) as in Arellano (2008) and postulate an
AR(1)-process for government consumption:
gˆt = ρggˆt−1 + εgt , εgt ∼ N (0, σ2g) . (5.10)
In assigning parameter values, we assume that a period in the model corresponds to
one quarter and adjust the parameter values of Arellano’s calibration to annual frequency
accordingly. In terms of government consumption, we assume g¯ = 0.18, the average share
of government consumption in our sample. We set ρg = 0.986 to capture the persistence
of a shock to government consumption under fiscal stress and σg = 0.014 to match the
standard deviation of a government consumption shock in our sample. For the government
spending multiplier we assume  = 0.7, a value, as discussed above, in line with the
estimates reported in the literature. It is also consistent with what our empirical analysis
suggests for times of fiscal stress. Table 5 summarizes the parameter values. The model is
solved by discretizing the AR(1)-process into a 101-point Markov chain in the range of
±4 σg and using value function iteration on a 2000-point grid for debt on [0, 1.32].
We compute the generalized impulse response of the default premium to a change in
government consumption.32 As in our empirical analysis we distinguish initial conditions
32Generalized impulse responses account for the nonlinearity of the model (see, Koop et al., 1996).
We compute responses on the basis of stochastic simulations as the difference in the dynamics after a
deterministic shock at time 1 and the dynamics in the absence of a shock. We approximate the sovereign
default premium rt − r by δt. As in our empirical analysis we exclude default episodes. We report results
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Table 5: Parameter values used in model simulations
Parameter r σ β θ y¯ y¯def g¯ ρg σg 
Value 1.7% 2 0.988 0.07 1 0.969 0.18 0.986 0.014 0.7
Note: Parameter values follow Arellano (2008) where applicable (adjusted for model
calibration to quarterly frequency). See text for details.
in terms of fiscal stress. For this purpose we adjust the initial level of debt. For a debt
level of 8% below the average, fiscal stress is absent, that is, the default premium is zero.
To capture fiscal stress, we assume that debt is initially 8 percent above the average level.
In this case the default premium amounts to 36 basis points.33
Results are shown in Figure 6: solid lines represent the responses in the absence of
fiscal stress, while dashed lines correspond to the case of fiscal stress. Horizontal axes
measure time in quarters, vertical axes measure basis points. On the left and in the
middle, we show results for an increase and a decrease of government consumption by one
standard deviation, respectively. On the right, we consider a decrease by three standard
deviations. To make responses comparable, we divide the response by 3 in case of the
large shock.
The premium is hardly affected by the shock in the absence of stress, even if the shock
is large. Instead, it reacts strongly if there is fiscal stress. The response is still relatively
weak, however, if government consumption increases (left). Instead, the premium rises
strongly, if government consumption is reduced (middle). Moreover, the response of the
premium increases more than proportionally in the size of the shock (right). In sum, the
model predictions are in line with our empirical findings. This holds true for the role of
initial conditions in terms of fiscal stress, as well as for the role of the sign and the size of
an innovation of government consumption. Moreover, it also holds true for the finding
that the premium rises in response to a cut of government consumption.
The predictions of the model depend on the assumption that there is a positive
multiplier effect.34 To see why, recall that a cut of government consumption reduces
based on the average over 100,000 replications.
33For higher debt levels, in case of a large (3 standard deviation) cut of government consumption
default turns out to be optimal.
34If we set  = 0, a reduction of government consumption reduces the sovereign default premium.
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Figure 6: Generalized impulse response to a change of government consumption. Notes:
Horizontal axes represent quarters. Vertical axes represent deviations from
the path w/o shock, measured in basis points. Right: response is divided by 3.
output due to the multiplier effect. Yet, because the multiplier is below unity, output net
of government consumption increases in response to a cut of government consumption.
This, all else equal, makes default less attractive. The effect is muted, however, relative
to the scenario without a multiplier effect. Moreover, there is a second margin by which
the multiplier effect impacts the default decisions: as output declines with government
consumption, the output loss due to default declines as well. This is because, in specifying
the kinked function (5.5), we follow Arellano and assume that default is less harmful if
the economy is already in dire straits.
Overall, the cut of government consumption raises the incentive to default. This
becomes apparent from the increase of the default premium which reflects the assessment
of market participants. They understand the trade-off which determines the default
decision and price default risk in an actuarially fair manner, namely according to condition
(5.4). Fiscal stress amplifies the response of the premium, because condition (5.4) is convex
in δt. For the same reason, the premium increases disproportionately as government
consumption is reduced. We thus stress that sovereign debt is priced consistently via
condition (5.4). Put differently, there is nothing “schizophrenic” about financial markets:
in the presence of fiscal stress, a cut of government consumption may trigger a further
increase of the default premium, because markets correctly foresee a heightened temptation
to default. This temptation lasts as long as output remains depressed.
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6 Conclusion
Does austerity cause the sovereign default premium to decline? In pursuing this question,
we make two distinct contributions. First, we set up a new data set containing data
for 38 emerging and advanced economies. We assemble quarterly observations for an
unbalanced panel from 1990 to 2014, not only for the sovereign default premium, but also
for government consumption and output. A first look at the data allows us to establish
a number of basic facts. First, while there is a large variation in the default premium,
both across time and countries, it is moderate for the largest part of our sample. Second,
the default premium is strongly countercyclical. The correlation of the default premium
and output growth is negative in all 38 countries. Third, across countries there is no
systematic correlation pattern for the default premium and government consumption.
As a second contribution, we assess how the default premium responds to a cut
of government consumption. In doing so, we account for three dimensions. First, we
distinguish the short and the long run. We find that a cut of government consumption
raises the premium in the short run, but reduces it in the long run. Second, we condition
on initial conditions. We find that the short-run increase of the premium obtains only in
the presence of fiscal stress, that is, if the default premium is already high. Third, the
effect of an increase of government consumption depends on its size: the premium reacts
more than proportionally, as the cut of government consumption gets larger.
We rationalize our findings for the short run within a structural model of optimal
sovereign default. It turns out that assuming a fairly moderate fiscal multiplier is sufficient
for the model predictions to conform with the evidence. In the model, risk-neutral investors
price sovereign default risk in an actuarially fair manner. They demand a higher default
premium in response to a cut of government consumption, because they understand
that the temptation to default increases as output is temporarily reduced. This is also
consistent with our findings for the long run: the premium peaks after about one year
and comes down rather quickly afterwards—at about the same time as output rebounds.
Our results have important implications for policy. First, whether austerity is painful in
the short run depends on the level of fiscal stress. As spending cuts cause little harm under
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benign initial conditions, it is advisable to prevent fiscal stress from building up in the first
place. Admittedly, more often than not policy makers will have missed this opportunity.
As a result, austerity is likely to be painful in the short run and the temptation to renege
on debt obligations increases. Because market participants understand this, they demand
a higher default premium. A naive observer may therefore conclude that “austerity is not
working”. In this regard, however, our analysis offers a second important insight: if policy
makers and the electorate show sufficient resolve, carrying through with austerity will
eventually be rewarded by better financing conditions. Austerity pays off in the long run.
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A Appendix
A.1 Details on the construction of the default premium
In this subsection, we provide additional information on the construction of default premia
and data sources.
A.1.1 EMBI spreads
The J.P. Morgan EMBI is an emerging market debt benchmark that includes “U.S.-dollar-
denominated Brady bonds, Eurobonds, traded loans, and local market debt instruments
issued by sovereign and quasi-sovereign entities” (JP Morgan, 1999). For our purposes, it
is important to note that debt instruments must have at least 2.5 years of maturity left for
inclusion and remain in the index until 12 months before maturity. This implies that the
maturity of the EMBI does not necessarily stay constant over time as the maturity of the
underlying debt portfolio may change. The EMBI spread “corresponds to the weighted
average of these securities’ yield difference to the US Treasury securities with similar
maturity, considered risk free. This risk premium is called in the market as the spread
over Treasury of this portfolio” (Banco Central do Brasil, 2014). Inclusion of a bond into
the EMBI requires a minimum bond issue size of $500 million. This ensures that the
liquidity premium compared to U.S. bonds is not too large.35
The data is retrieved from Datastream. The mnemonic is JPMG followed by a
three letter country identifier. We rely on stripped spreads (Datastream Mnemonic:
SSPRD), which “strip” out collateral and guarantees from the calculation. For example,
JPMGARG(SSPRD) is the mnemonic for the Argentinean EMBI spread.
A.1.2 CDS spreads data
CDS spreads are from Datastream and spliced from two sources. Until 2010Q3, Datastream
provides CDS spreads from Credit Market Analysis Limited (CMA), while Thomson
Reuters, starting in 2008 provides CDS for an increasing number of issuers.36 The contract
type we choose is five years of maturity with complete restructuring (CR). The CMA CDS
spreads are typically denominated in dollar, while the Thomson Reuters CDS spreads
are often available in euro and dollar. Despite CDS spreads being theoretically unit free
as they are measured in basis points, the choice of denomination currency choice can be
relevant for sovereign entities. The reason is that, e.g., being reimbursed in U.S. dollar
when Germany defaults may provide an insurance against exchange rate risk. (for more
on this and CDS contracts in general, see, e.g., Buchholz and Tonzer, 2013; Fontana and
35For more information on the EMBI see JP Morgan (1999). Banco Central do Brasil (2014) provides
a very accessible general introduction to the EMBI.
36Additional information on the distinction and the how to match the two series can be found at
http://extranet.datastream.com/data/CDS/.
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Scheicher, 2010). To exclude an exchange rate risk premium, we use Thomson Reuters
CDS spreads in U.S. dollar for all non-EMU countries and Thomson Reuters Euro CDS
spreads in euro for euro area members after EMU accession. Unfortunately, for early time
periods, the currency-specific Thomson Reuters CDS spreads are not always available. In
this case, we rely on the CMA CDS spreads.
A.1.3 Spread decomposition
In the main text, we use the difference between nominal yields on foreign-currency bonds
and a risk-free reference bond to measure the default premium. We elaborate on this in
the following.
For most practical purposes, the nominal yield to maturity of a bond, rnomt can be
decomposed as
rnomt = r
real,riskfree
t +Et (pit+1)+RP Inflt +Et (δt+1)+RP defaultt +RP termt +RP
liqu
t +εt, (A.1)
where rreal,riskfreet is the real risk-free interest rate, Et (pit+1) is the compensation for
expected inflation, RP Inflt denotes the premium for inflation risk, and RP termt the term
premium.37 We are mostly interested in the next two components that we subsume under
the heading “default premium”: the compensation for expected default Et (δt+1) and the
default risk premium RP defaultt . The term RP liqut captures liquidity risk premia, while εt
captures other (higher order) terms. In order to isolate the terms of interest to us, we
compute the yield spread between foreign-currency bonds and a default-risk free reference
bond/bond index of a similar maturity. Under integrated financial markets, its yield,
r∗,nomt , will be given by
r∗,nomt = rreal,riskfreet + Et (pit+1) +RP Inflt +RP termt +RP
∗,liqu
t + ε∗t . (A.2)
The default-related terms are zero. The real risk-free interest rate, the inflation premium,
and the term premium should be the same as in Equation (A.1), as we consider a bond
denominated in the same currency and with the same maturity.38 A yield spread computed
this way will thus only contain the default-related premium and the difference of the
liquidity risk premium as well as higher order terms. Unfortunately, it is not easy to
isolate the difference in liquidity premia. However, we are quite confident that liquidity is
not driving our results for three reasons. First, markets for government bonds are typically
quite liquid so that any liquidity premium should be small. Second, the risk premium
consist of the price of risk times the quantity of risk. With integrated financial markets,
the price of risk tends to be a common factor that will be accounted for by our time-fixed
37This is a second order effect arising from the covariance of returns with the stochastic discount factor.
It is absent if all investors are risk neutral.
38Regarding the term premium, it is actually the duration of expected cash flows that matters. This
might introduce small differences of the term premium (see Broner et al., 2013).
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effects, leaving only the quantity component of liquidity risk as a confounding factor (see
also the discussion in Section A.2.). Finally, we find that our main results also obtain
for a sample of developed economies where markets are very liquid. Results also hold up
if we drop observations after the beginning of the recent financial crisis—a period when
liquidity dried up considerably.
A.2 Price of risk and quantity of risk
Our measure of the default premium reflects the quantity of risk times the price of risk.
The price of risk may be time-varying with global risk aversion (see, e.g., Bekaert et al.,
2013). However, this should not be a problem in our setup as the price of risk-component
should be global and is thus captured by time-fixed effects. This is equivalent to including
the VIX as a control. However, our fiscal stress indicator is also based on default premia
and thus depends on the price of risk as well. Thus, while the cross-section of our fiscal
stress indicator is unaffected by the price of risk, the time series dimension may be affected
as the price of risk will be simultaneously high for all countries at a particular point
in time. However, results are robust to dropping the Great Recession period from our
sample—a period when price of risk spiked.
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Figure A.1: Construction of sovereign yield spread: Italy and United Kingdom.
A.3 Construction of data set: example
To illustrate the construction of our data set, Figure A.1 provides two examples, namely
data for Italy (top) and the United Kingdom (bottom). Until 1991 only one Italian foreign
currency-bond is available. Starting in 1992, we obtain a second bond and compute the
yield spread as the average over those bonds. When the first bond matures in 1997, we
are left with one bond until 1999. From that point on, we use the long-term convergence
bond yields provided by the ECB. For the United Kingdom, we have two different bonds
available to cover the early part of the sample, with missing values in between. From
2007 on, we rely on CMA CDS spreads, while in 2008 the Thomson Reuters CDS spreads
become available, which are used for the rest of the sample.39
39For details, see Appendix A.1.2.
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B Additional tables and figures
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Figure A.2: Values of empirical CDF (Country group-specific) for lagged default premia
and smoothed output gaps.
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Table A.1: Descriptive statistics: indicator functions
Country mean (F stress) mean (F recess) corr (F stress, F recess)
Argentina 0.82 0.53 0.60
Australia 0.39 0.56 0.69
Austria 0.40 0.48 0.34
Belgium 0.51 0.51 0.40
Brazil 0.68 0.53 0.19
Bulgaria 0.46 0.52 0.70
Chile 0.25 0.51 0.63
Colombia 0.54 0.54 0.30
Croatia 0.31 0.45 0.53
Czech Republic 0.50 0.46 0.85
Denmark 0.50 0.52 0.33
Ecuador 0.91 0.50 0.05
El Salvador 0.59 0.45 0.55
Finland 0.45 0.44 0.31
France 0.40 0.47 0.27
Germany 0.27 0.49 0.11
Greece 0.58 0.55 0.70
Hungary 0.28 0.44 0.43
Ireland 0.49 0.51 0.12
Italy 0.60 0.51 0.25
Latvia 0.76 0.51 0.52
Lithuania 0.73 0.46 0.53
Malaysia 0.27 0.51 0.53
Mexico 0.55 0.49 0.11
Netherlands 0.37 0.50 0.37
Peru 0.56 0.56 0.30
Poland 0.32 0.53 0.44
Portugal 0.49 0.52 0.13
Slovakia 0.54 0.44 0.80
Slovenia 0.58 0.45 0.64
South Africa 0.41 0.48 0.56
Spain 0.48 0.51 0.54
Sweden 0.47 0.52 0.04
Thailand 0.20 0.52 0.40
Turkey 0.66 0.51 0.22
United Kingdom 0.54 0.44 0.34
United States 0.39 0.55 -0.17
Uruguay 0.58 0.51 -0.05
Notes: F stress denotes the values of the country group-specific empirical CDF of the lagged default
premium; F recess denotes the empirical CDF of the smoothed output gap, computed as the z-scored
deviation of the 5 quarter moving average of the output growth rate from its HP-filtered trend (λ = 160,000).
First column: average value of the fiscal stress indicator for the respective country. Second column:
average value of the recession indicator for the respective country. Last column: correlation between the
two indicators.
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Figure A.3: Values of empirical CDF (Country group-specific) for lagged default premia
and smoothed output gaps.
50
98 01 04 07 10 13
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Turkey
93 96 99 02 05 08 11
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
United Kingdom
08 10 12 14
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
United States
02 05 08 11 14
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Uruguay
Fiscal Stress
Recession
Figure A.4: Values of empirical CDF (Country group-specific) for lagged default premia
and smoothed output gaps.
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Figure A.5: Dynamic response of default premium to cut of government consumption
by 1 percent: semi-annual observations. Results based on local projections
conditional on the absence of fiscal stress (solid lines) and on the presence
of stress (dashed lines). Panel (a): responses based on forecast error
of government consumption, Panel (b): responses based on government
consumption (OECD sample of semi-annual observations).
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Figure A.6: Dynamic response to cut of government consumption by 1 percent in the
four-variable model. Notes: see Figure 4.
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Figure A.7: Dynamic response to cut of government consumption by 1 percent in the
four-variable model. Notes: see Figure 4.
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(b) Euro area: crisis countries
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Figure A.8: Dynamic response to cut of government consumption by 1 percent: euro
area samples. Notes: see Figure 4.
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(a) Developed economies
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(b) Emerging economies
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(c) Excluding Great Recession: conditional on fiscal stress
Figure A.9: Dynamic response to cut of government consumption by 1 percent: panels
(a) and (b) show results for local projections on developed and emerging
economies separately; panel (c) shows results for when the Great Recession
period is dropped from the sample. Notes: see Figure 4.
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(a) Unconditional model: baseline vs. mean group estimator
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(b) Monetary union or dollarization
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(c) Countries with their own legal tender
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Figure A.10: Dynamic response to cut of government consumption by 1 percent. Panel
(a): comparison of unconditional baseline estimates with those obtained
using mean group estimator. Panel (b): sample includes only country-
quarter observations for countries which are members of a monetary union
or de jure dollarized. Panel (c): only country-quarter observations when
countries have their own legal tender. Panel (d): only country-quarter
observations w/o IMF program. Notes: see Figure 4.
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(a) Default premia measured in logs
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(b) Conservative sample for government consumption
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(c) Boom vs. recession
Figure A.11: Dynamic response to cut of government consumption by 1 percent. Panel
(a): default premia measured in logs. Panel (b): conservative sample
where we could confirm that government spending data was derived from
direct sources. Panel (d): conditioning on booms and recessions (output
gap used as indicator variable). Notes: see Figure 4.
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